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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher Hudson appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to felony possession of methamphetamine with the intent 
to deliver. Hudson contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Officer Klepich observed Hudson and another individual running away 
from him and attempting to hide in a high crime neighborhood. (9/11/12 Tr., p.5, 
L.22 - p.11, L.12.) Officer Klepich briefly detained Hudson in an attempt to 
determine if Hudson was engaged in criminal activity. (9/11/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-
21.) Officer Klepich then confirmed the existence of an arrest warrant for 
Hudson and placed him under arrest. (9/11/12 Tr., p.13, L. 8 - p.14, L.6.) 
At the same time, dispatch advised Officer Klepich they had received a 
call regarding a van at the same location "that the police should take a look at." 
(9/11/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-12.) Hudson claimed to have walked to his location 
when asked if he had been driving the van or knew anything about what was in it. 
(9/11/12 Tr., p.20, L.10 - p.21, L.2.) As they walked around the van, officers 
saw a glass pipe with white residue in the center console while looking in the 
windows. (9/11/12 Tr., p.16, L.24- p.17, L.14.) Officers then searched the van 
and found further contraband as weli as Hudson's wallet and identification. 
(9/11/12Tr., p.19, L.12-p.20, L.3.) 
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The state charged Hudson with trafficking in methamphetamine and injury 
to jail. (R., Vol. I, pp.50-51.) Hudson filed a motion to suppress, asserting there 
was "no well recognized exception ... which wou!d justify the warrantless search" 
of himself and the van. (R., Vol. I, pp.71-72.) Foilowing a hearing on the motion, 
wherein witnesses testified on behalf of both parties, the court denied the 
motion, finding Hudson "did not have standing to challenge the search of the 
vehicle." (R., Vol. I, p.140.) 
Hudson entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended charge of 
possession with intent to deliver, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress. (R., Vol. II, pp.225-226.) Hudson's plea was pursuant to a 
Rule 11 agreement wherein the state dismissed the injury to jail charge and both 
parties agreed to a 12-year unified sentence with the first two years fixed. (R., 
Vol. II, pp.227-229.) The court sentenced Hudson to tvvo years fixed followed by 
ten years indeterminate. (R., Vol. II, pp.240-242; 1/16/13 Tr., p.17, L.17 - p.18, 




Hudson states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hudson's motion to 
suppress, because the detention of Mr. Hudson and subsequent 
search of the van were in violation of Mr. Hudson's constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures? 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




Hudson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denyina His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Hudson's motion to suppress, finding 
that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe criminal activity 
was afoot and as therefore entitled to make a brief investigatory stop of Hudson. 
(9/11/12 Tr., p.109, L.12 - p.2.) Additionally, it found once a valid arrest warrant 
for Hudson was discovered and he was arrested and mirandized, he disavowed 
any ownership of the vehicle searched, thus Hudson lacked standing, or a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, in the van. (9/11/12 Tr., p.110, Ls.3-19.) On 
appeal, Hudson argues the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain 
him nor was the search of the van justified. (Appellant's brief, p.16.) Hudson's 
claims fail. 
A review of the record, in light of the applicable legal standards, supports 
the district court's determination that the totality of the circumstances present at 
the time justified the brief detention of Hudson to allow the officer to determine if 
criminal activity was afoot. Further, Hudson failed to establish that the search of 
the van infringed on his own reasonable expectation of privacy. As such, the 
district court did not err when it denied Hudson's motion to suppress. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clear!y erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 
485-6, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 
309 (2004). 
C. Hudson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion To Suppress 
Hudson has failed to demonstrate that the district court's denial of the 
motion to suppress was error, as the record supports a finding that he was not 
impermissibly seized and that he failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the van searched to challenge it through a suppression hearing. 
1. The Officer Had Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To Justify 
Hudson's Brief Detention 
Not all contacts between officers and citizens involve a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991 ); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 7 P.3d 219 
(2000); State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 978 P.2d 212 (1999); State v. Nelson, 
134 Idaho 675, 8 P.3d 670 (Ct. App. 2000); and State v. Clifford, 130 Idaho 259, 
939 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1997). There are three types of contacts between law 
enforcement and private citizens: (1) consensual encounters, which are not 
seizures and, therefore, require no justification; (2) stop/investigative detentions, 
which are seizures justified by reasonable suspicion; and (3) actual arrest, which 
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are seizures justified by probable cause. State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 
P 2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Zubizareta, 122 !daho 823, 839 P.2d 1237 
(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 815 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991); 
and State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 701 P.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Under Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer may lawfully stop a 
suspect for investigative purposes only when the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terrv, 
392 U.S. at 30; State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641, 643-44 
(1998). Reasonab1e suspicion must be more than a mere hunch; it must be 
based on specific articulable facts and the rational inferences that naturally 
follow from those facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Galleaos, 120 Idaho 894, 
896-97, 821 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1991 ). To justify the officer's detention of a 
defendant, the State is not required to prove the defendant's guilt on the 
underlying offense. State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 492-93, 111 P.3d 625, 638-
39 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 502, 36 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Ct. 
App. 2001 ). Rather, the reasonableness of the police officer's suspicion is 
evaluated based upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); State v. Rawlings, 121 
Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 
515, 37 P.3d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Here, Officer Klepich, an officer with over 10 years of experience, 
observed Hudson and another individual while patrolling a high crime 
neighborhood. (9/11/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-24.) The two individuals "seemed to have 
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the desire to avoid [the officer] seeing them." (9/11/12 Tr.. p.6, Ls.1-2.) The 
subjects went out of the officer's sight (9/11/12 Tr., p.6, Ls.4-7) until he once 
again spotted them running towards an apartment complex (9/11/12 Tr., p.8, 
L.20 - p.9, L.10). The officer found Hudson lying on the ground, hiding behind a 
planter. (9/11/12 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-17.) When Officer Klepich approached Hudson, 
he "jumped up into a standing position and said 'What? There's nothing going 
on here."' (9/11/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-12.) Hudson was "looking up and down the 
road, perspiring[,] ... [and] breathing heavy," all indicators to Officer Klepich of 
"someone that was trying to leave - getting ready to leave." (9/11/12 Tr., p.12, 
Ls.9-12.) 
The court found, based on the totality of these circumstances, the officer 
had a basis to detain Hudson to determine what he was doing: 
Vvhen you take all of those factors into consideration - the 
initial observations and the conduct of the defendant, shortly 
thereafter seeing them run down, and when the officer gets out -
and, in particular, the defendant hiding behind the planter - it gives 
the officer some concern that there is something afoot. And as the 
cases indicate, an officer can rely on evidence of flight to establish 
reasonable suspicion. 
That is coupled with the fact that we're in a high crime area, 
based upon the testimony of the officer. Again, simply being in a 
high crime area, in and of itself, is not sufficient for the stop. But 
the totality of all of these circumstances known to the officer at the 
time gives a basis for this officer to make the valid stop and 
detention. 
(9/11/12Tr., p.109, L.12-p.110, L.2.) 
Because the officer's observations of Hudson led him to believe Hudson 
may have been involved in criminal conduct based on the totality of the 
circumstances, Officer Klepich had reasonable suspicion to stop Hudson and 
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either allay or confirm his suspicion. Hudson was thereafter placed under arrest 
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant.'. 
Because his detention was based on reasonable suspicion under the 
totality of the circumstances, Hudson has failed to demonstrate that he was 
impermissibly detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and has therefore 
necessarily failed to demonstrate error in the district court's denial of his motion 
to suppress on this basis. 
2. Hudson Did Not Have A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The 
Van Necessary Support His Objection To Its Search 
The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an 
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 177 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Thus, as a 
threshold matter, "one who challenges the legality of a search must establish that 
he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the thing searched." State v. 
Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)). As explained by the Idaho 
1 Even assuming the initial detention of Hudson was impermissible, the discovery 
of the warrant would have justified his arrest and the ultimate search incident to 
arrest leading to his current underlying charges. A valid arrest is an intervening 
circumstance, such that evidence discovered as a result of that arrest is 
untainted by any unlawfulness in a search and seizure that preceded the lawful 
arrest. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 845-46, 103 P.3d 454, 458-59 (2004); 
United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997) (outstanding arrest warrant 
gives the officer independent probable cause such that, had the officers acted 
unlawfully, the warrant would constitute an intervening circumstance dissipating 
the taint of the illegality). Hudson does not challenge the validity of the 
underlying arrest warrant on appeal. (See generally. Appellant's brief.) 
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Court of Appeals: 
One who voluntarily abandons property prior to the search cannot 
be said to possess the requisite privacy interest. Abel v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668, 687 
(1960). Abandonment, in the Fourth Amendment context, occurs 
through words, acts, and other objective facts indicating that the 
defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise 
relinquished his interest in his property. See United States v. 
Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir. 1994); Bond v. United 
States, 77 F.3d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996). If the abandonment is 
caused by illegal police conduct, however, the abandonment is not 
voluntary. See United States v. Roman, 849 F.2d 920, 923 (5th 
Cir. 1988); United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1045 (6th Cir. 
1982). 
Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52, 981 P .2d at 1162. 
The district court determined Hudson did "not have standing to challenge 
the search of the vehicle" where he "disavow[ed] the ownership [and denied] 
having driven the vehicle there." (9/11/12 Tr., p.110, Ls.17-22.) Hudson, 
however, argues "he did not abandon the van prior to the search and he had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the van." (Appellant's brief, p.24.) 
Application of the above legal principles to the facts of this case shows that 
Hudson voluntarily abandoned any privacy interest he may have had in the van 
and its contents when, during a lawful detention following an arrest pursuant to a 
valid warrant, he disclaimed any ownership of it. 
Hudson does not appear to dispute that he denied any association with 
the van, instead arguing the timing of his denial of interest in the van invalidates 
any claim of abandonment by the state because he was required to abandon any 
interest prior to a search. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-26.) This argument, however, 
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is unsupported by !aw or the facts as found by the court at the suppression 
hearing. 
Officer Klepich detained and then arrested Hudson on an outstanding 
warrant and placed him in the back of another officer's patrol car for transport. 
(9/11/12 Tr., p15, Ls.3-7.) He advised Hudson of his Miranda rights. 2 Officer 
Klepich received information from dispatch that someone had called in and told 
them they needed to ,look at a van that was in the same area Hudson had just 
been anested. (9/11/12 Tr., p.15, Ls10-13.) The van was parked on the street 
with the doors closed. (9/11/12 Tr., p.16, L.24 - p.17., L.1.) Officer Klepich 
approached the van where, from the passenger side window, he observed the 
center console where he could see "a glass pipe protruding up out of that that 
had a white residue in that." (9/11/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.8-13.) After finding more 
evidence of drugs and Hudson's wallet containing his identification in the van's 
center console (9/11/12 Tr., p.19, L.4 - p.20, L.3), Officer Klepich approached 
Hudson and asked if he knew anything about the van or anything in the van 
(9/11/12 Tr., p.20, Ls.10-16). Hudson denied having driven the van, stating he 
had walked there to see his child and had "nothing to do with the vehicle or any 
blue van." (9/11/12 Tr., p.43, Ls.12-13.) The officer did not confront Hudson 
with the items found in the van or ask if he had anything to do with the drugs 
2 Although Hudson continues to argue the timing of the receipt of his Miranda 
rights on appeal, the record supports the district court's conclusion that Hudson 
was aware of his rights prior to his disavowment. (9/11/12 Tr., p.110, Ls.7-11; 
p.99, L.22 - p.101, L.19.) 
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found therein. Instead, he asked a general question about Hudson's knowledge 
of the van to which Hudson gave an unequivocal answer that he had nothing to 
do with the van and had not driven it to that location. This evidenced Hudson's 
abandonment of the vehic!e and the property within and denied him of any 
legitimate expectation of privacy upon which to claim the search of the van was 
unlawful. 
Further, although Hudson claims he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the van because he was "a non-owner driver authorized to control the 
vehicle" (Appellant's brief, p.26), this position is not supported by the record. At 
the suppression hearing, the owner of the van, Hudson's grandmother, 
recounted her previous testimony that although the everyone in the family used 
it, "'Chris was not allowed to take the van because he had a warrant"' (9/11/12 
Tr., p.56, Ls.21-22.) 
Having failed to meet his threshold burden of establishing a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the methamphetamine located next to his wallet, both of 
which he voluntary abandoned, Hudson has failed to establish a basis for 
suppression of that evidence. 
3. If This Court Determines Hudson Did Have A Reasonable 
Expectation Of Privacy In The Van, The Officers Were Justified In 
Performing The Search Pursuant To The Automobile Exception 
Contrary to Hudson's assertion, if he did have standing to contest the 
search of the vehicle, the officers were justified in performing the search 
pursuant to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment after seeing 
seizable contraband in plain view. The district court correctly found the officer's 
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observation of the pipe with drug residue in the console of the van provided a 
basis for an exception to the warrant requirement: 
As fai as the pipe being seen in the vehicle, it was in p!ain view. 
And so even if the defendant had standing to challenge the search 
because it was in plain view, the officer had the authority to seize 
that evidence and contraband from the vehicle. 
(9/11/12 Tr., p.111, Ls.14-18.) 
The "plain view" doctrine justifies a warrantless seizure of contraband 
where two requirements are met: (1) the officer must lawfully make an initial 
intrusion or otherwise properly be in a position to observe a particular area; and 
(2) it must be immediately apparent that the items observed are evidence of a 
crime or otherwise subject to seizure. State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 558, 21 
P.3d 491, 494 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 
133, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); State v. Claiborne, 120 Idaho 581, 
586, 818 P.2d 285, 290 (1991); State v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 158, 922 
P.2d 1081, 1084 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
Here, the van was parked on a public street when the police received a 
call that they needed to "look at" the van. (9/11/12 Tr., p.38, L.16 - p.39, L.13.) 
Officer Klepich testified as to the steps taken after this call came into dispatch, 
Well, the van was just parked on the street there. There's 
not a lot to check out on a van parked that's just parked there with 
the doors closed. And so we kind of looked around the outside, 
and we were just standing outside the vehicle looking into the 
vehicle. On the passenger's side of the vehicle, you could see in 
the center console. 
And when I say "center console," there's a space between 
the seats in the can. 
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And just looking through the window from outside the van, I 
could see a - there was, like, a camera case, a nylon zip-up type 
case that was unzipped and sitting there. And there was a glass 
pipe protruding up out of that that had a white residue in it that, 
from my training and experience, appeared to be drug 
paraphernalia, like a methamphetamine pipe. 
(9/11/12 Tr., p.16, L.24 - p.17, L.14.) Officers were entitled to be on a public 
street where they were looking into a call to dispatch about a vehicle. They did 
not enter the van, instead they merely walked around it and looked in the 
windows. From that lawful vantage point, Officer Klepich observed what was 
immediately apparent to him, based on his training and experience, iliegal 
contraband. This observation led to probable cause to believe a search of the 
van wou!d uncover further contraband or evidence of a crime. 
The "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement allows the police to 
search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the 
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979); State v. Buti, 
131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 
P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981). The extent to which police officers may conduct a 
search under the automobile exception was addressed by the Supreme Court, 
which held: 
[T]he scope of the warrantless search authorized by [this} 
exception is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could 
legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable cause justifies the 
search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every 
part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of 
the search. 
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United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982). The scope of a search 
pursuant to the automobile exception may extend to containers found within the 
car. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991 ). The analysis of 
whether an officer had probable cause for an automobile search is whether, 
based on the objective facts, a magistrate would have issued a warrant under 
similar circumstances. State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 864, 934 P.2d 34, 37 
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 123, 795 P.2d 15, 17 (Ct. 
App. 1990). Determining the existence of probable cause is "a practical, 
common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances ... , there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found .... " Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Probable cause does not require an actual 
showing of criminal activity, but only the "probabiiity or substantial chance" of 
such activity. kt at 244-45 n.13. A practical, nontechnical probability that 
incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 742 (1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981 ). The 
facts known to the officers must be judged in accordance with "the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, 
not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
It is a reasonable inference that a nylon back containing a 
methamphetamine pipe with residue may contain further evidence of drugs. 
The district court's findings support a practical, common sense determination 
that, given all the circumstances, there was a fair probability that contraband or 
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evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle. As such, the state requests 
that this Court affirm the district court's order denying suppression of evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Hudson's motion to suppress. 
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